linkedin-outreach
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted external data into agent-generated content.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches lead signals such as
{comment_snippet}and{job_posting_detail}from Supabase tables or user-provided CSV files, as detailed in the Phase 1 Lead Selection and Phase 3 Message Generation sections ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The sequence templates in
templates/sequence-templates/do not utilize explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks) or specific 'ignore' instructions to isolate the lead-sourced data from the generation prompt. - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write CSV files to the local
output/directory, perform network operations via the Supabase client to log outreach attempts, and optionally interact with Google Sheets for reporting. - Sanitization: To mitigate risks, the skill includes a 'Calibration Loop' in Phase 3 for initial review of sample messages and a mandatory 'Hard Approval Gate' in Phase 5 that requires explicit human confirmation before finalizing the campaign.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation references the execution of local scripts for environment setup.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides instructions for runningpython3 tools/supabase/setup_database.pyto prepare the database schema for the skill's operations.
Audit Metadata