media-proxy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script
scripts/media_proxy.pyreads user credentials from the sensitive file path~/.gooseworks/credentials.jsonto obtain API keys and service endpoints. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Sensitive API tokens are transmitted as query parameters in HTTP requests (e.g.,
?token=...). This is an insecure pattern as URL parameters are commonly logged in plain text by proxy servers, web servers, and browser history, leading to potential credential exposure. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides the ability to write external content to arbitrary local paths via the
downloadfunction and theresume.pyscript's--outargument. Usingurllib.request.urlretrieveandpathlib.Path.write_bytes, it lacks validation on the destination path, creating a risk where the agent could be manipulated into overwriting critical system files or configurations (e.g.,~/.ssh/authorized_keys). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted data:
- Ingestion points: Arguments such as
payload,prompt, andurlinscripts/media_proxy.pyare interpolated into network requests or used for downloads. - Boundary markers: There are no markers or instructions to help the agent distinguish between data and potentially malicious embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including network requests via
requestsand file system writes viaurllib.requestandpathlib. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, filtering, or escaping for the external content processed by the skill.
Audit Metadata