render-editorial-motion-podcast
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external configuration files (
config.jsonandconfig.example.json) to define image prompts and audio timing. This data is interpolated into media processing workflows without sanitization or boundary markers, creating a surface where malicious instructions in the input files could potentially influence agent behavior.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/config.example.jsonand the user-providedconfig.jsoncontainingkeyframe_promptand audio metadata.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not define delimiters to isolate untrusted configuration data from system instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
ffmpegfor video concatenation and ken-burns effects, andPIL(Pillow) for image compositing, involving multiple subprocess calls across the pipeline.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not describe any validation or escaping of input values before they are used in media processing commands.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides and instructs the agent to execute multiple shell commands for media processing and tool installation.\n
- Evidence:
PIPELINE.mdandREADME.mdcontain bash code blocks forffmpegoperations such as clipping, muxing, and applying filters.\n - Evidence: The skill references the execution of a Python script (
caption.py) from a related capability and utilizesnpxfor the installation and execution of vendor-provided tools.
Audit Metadata