render-vo-anchored-motion-listicle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates a complex media pipeline by executing several local Python scripts including
render_hf.py,grade_brolls_v4.py, andbuild_master_v4.py. It also relies heavily on theffmpegcommand-line tool for video encoding, concatenation, and audio normalization. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The rendering engine uses Playwright to load HTML 'hyperframes' and execute JavaScript animations via the Web Animations API (
window.renderAt(t)). This allows the agent to generate video frames deterministically from web content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests user-defined content such as headlines, body text, and callouts from the configuration file. These values are interpolated into HTML templates rendered by a headless browser. While this could theoretically be used for cross-site scripting (XSS) within the isolated Playwright environment, the impact is limited to the rendering of the specific video asset.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied text in
beats[].headline,beats[].body, andbeats[].calloutfields in the configuration. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or sanitization logic is described for the HTML template interpolation.
- Capability inventory: Access to the local file system (via FFmpeg/Python) and headless browser execution (via Playwright).
- Sanitization: The provided instructions do not specify any escaping or validation mechanisms for the text injected into the hyperframes.
Audit Metadata