render-whiteboard-explainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
subprocessmodule to orchestrate local tools and internal scripts. It callsffmpegandffprobefor video encoding, audio mastering, and metadata inspection. It also executes its own sub-scripts (e.g.,gen-art.py,render.py,solve-layout.py) usingsys.executableto manage the multi-stage build process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with external APIs for media generation. It uses a centralized
media_proxy.pyhelper to route requests for voice generation (ElevenLabs) and image generation (FAL) through GooseWorks-managed proxy endpoints. It also bundles and uses open-source fonts (Permanent Marker, Titan One) from Google Fonts. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The renderer (
render.py) and layout solver (solve-layout.py) useimportlib.utilto dynamically load internal helper modules (lettering.py,anchors.py,illos.py) from the skill's script directory. This is used for modular code organization within the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided content from
beats.json, including voiceover scripts and drawing descriptions. This content is interpolated into prompt templates for generative AI models. While this presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, the risk is inherent to the generative nature of the skill and is mitigated by structured prompt templates and human review stages described in the documentation.
Audit Metadata