targeted-prospecting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses python3 -c to extract credentials from a local JSON file and sets environment variables. It also utilizes curl extensively to interact with various API endpoints for data retrieval.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Accesses sensitive credential information stored in ~/.gooseworks/credentials.json. This is used to authenticate with the vendor's API proxy (api.gooseworks.ai). While this follows standard configuration practices for the vendor's tools, the use of a local credentials file is a sensitive operation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Interacts with multiple third-party services (Apollo, Fiber, Nyne, Scrapegraph, Tavily, Hunter, Tomba, Sixtyfour, and Brand.dev) to gather prospecting data and verify contact information.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It scrapes external content from various sources, including job boards (Tavily/Scrapegraph) and prospect websites (Scrapegraph smartscraper).
  • Ingestion points: Website content from {job_board_url}, {prospect_domain}, and {user_company_domain} ingested via Scrapegraph APIs in steps 4, 6, and 7.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to separate untrusted web content from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities (curl) and file system read access (~/.gooseworks/credentials.json).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the scraped text is performed before the agent processes it for intent analysis or competitive intelligence.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 02:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — targeted-prospecting