targeted-prospecting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
python3 -cto extract credentials from a local JSON file and sets environment variables. It also utilizescurlextensively to interact with various API endpoints for data retrieval. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Accesses sensitive credential information stored in
~/.gooseworks/credentials.json. This is used to authenticate with the vendor's API proxy (api.gooseworks.ai). While this follows standard configuration practices for the vendor's tools, the use of a local credentials file is a sensitive operation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Interacts with multiple third-party services (Apollo, Fiber, Nyne, Scrapegraph, Tavily, Hunter, Tomba, Sixtyfour, and Brand.dev) to gather prospecting data and verify contact information.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It scrapes external content from various sources, including job boards (Tavily/Scrapegraph) and prospect websites (Scrapegraph smartscraper).
- Ingestion points: Website content from
{job_board_url},{prospect_domain}, and{user_company_domain}ingested via Scrapegraph APIs in steps 4, 6, and 7. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to separate untrusted web content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities (
curl) and file system read access (~/.gooseworks/credentials.json). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the scraped text is performed before the agent processes it for intent analysis or competitive intelligence.
Audit Metadata