burn-in-captions

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically installs Python packages (fal-client, jinja2) and Node.js dependencies (npm install within the remotion/ directory) during execution if they are not already present.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands using the subprocess module to invoke ffmpeg, ffprobe, npm, and npx remotion for tasks such as audio extraction, video probing, and caption rendering.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Audio extracted from the user's video is uploaded to fal.ai via the fal-client library to obtain word-level timestamps. While necessary for the skill's primary function, this involves sending potentially sensitive audio content to an external third-party AI provider.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through malicious transcription data processed during rendering.
  • Ingestion points: Transcription text received from the fal.ai API response in scripts/transcribe.py and user-provided corrections in scripts/caption.py.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent or rendering engine from interpreting instructions within the transcript.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses ffmpeg (scripts/burn.py) and npx remotion (scripts/remotion_render.py) to process subtitle data, which can include override tags.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization when interpolating transcript text into Jinja2 templates (scripts/ass_render.py) and React components (remotion/src/CaptionedVideo.tsx).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 04:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — burn-in-captions