commission-video-format-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the WebFetch tool to retrieve taxonomy definitions from external URLs and research video ads on platforms including YouTube, Meta Ad Library, and iSpot.tv.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/preflight.pyscript invokes thecpcommand viasubprocess.runto copy video files from~/Downloadsto a local working directory. This operation is a documented workaround for macOS Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) restrictions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs environment validation by executing a setup check script for the
watchskill dependency located at~/.claude/plugins/cache/claude-video/watch/*/scripts/setup.py. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The preflight script accesses
~/.config/watch/.envto verify the configuration of API keys for thewatchskill. The script only checks for key presence and identifies the service provider (Groq or OpenAI) without exposing the keys themselves. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external websites, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. This is mitigated by the architecture, which uses isolated sub-agents for data extraction and includes a human-in-the-loop gate for reviewing all synthesized ticket drafts before external transmission. Ingestion points: taxonomy URLs and external search results. Boundary markers: absent. Capability inventory: file copy operations and Linear API interaction. Sanitization: handled via LLM synthesis and mandatory human review.
Audit Metadata