create-end-card-from-reference
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several shell commands, including the
higgsfieldCLI for image generation, a Python script for rendering HTML with Playwright, andffmpegfor video scaling and QC frame extraction. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to external domains, including fetching brand wordmark images from user-supplied or sourced CDN URLs (e.g.,
touchland.com) and loading fonts from Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com). These are standard operations for the skill's purpose but involve external resource retrieval. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
Headline copyandMicro-labelsare ingested from the input brief. - Boundary markers: None are present; strings are inserted directly into the HTML source.
- Capability inventory: The resulting HTML is processed by a headless browser (Playwright) and then converted to video via
ffmpeg. Maliciously crafted headline text (e.g., containing<script>or other HTML tags) could execute in the browser context during the render phase. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the user-provided strings before they are written to
endcard.html.
Audit Metadata