format-script-to-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it transforms untrusted script content provided by the calling agent's conversation context.
- Ingestion points: Script content is ingested from the calling agent's conversation context as described in the Workflow section of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings are specified for the input script content.
- Capability inventory: The skill involves rewriting text based on templates and generating metadata comments for subsequent tools.
- Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the input content before it is processed by the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses a hardcoded absolute file path (
/Users/0xhbam/Desktop/Cursor/content-goose/DELIVERY_STYLES.md) to load its delivery style configuration. This exposes local system metadata, specifically the host's username ('0xhbam') and internal directory hierarchy, to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata