competitor-content-tracker

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to execute its various scraping modules.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains multiple python3 calls (Phases 1, 2, and 3) to run scripts located in skills/ subdirectories.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch data from external sources including competitor blogs, LinkedIn, and Twitter/X.
  • Evidence: The configuration in Phase 0 and the commands in Phases 1-3 target external URLs and handles for scraping via the Apify API.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted content from the web and processes it to create a synthesized summary.
  • Ingestion points: Data is pulled from external URLs (blogs) and social media profiles in Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions in Phase 4 (Analyze & Synthesize) do not specify the use of delimiters or provide instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the scraped text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows for local shell command execution (python3 scripts) and file writes to the clients/ directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the ingested content before it is passed to the LLM for synthesis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 10, 2026, 03:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — competitor-content-tracker