competitor-content-tracker
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to execute its various scraping modules.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multiplepython3calls (Phases 1, 2, and 3) to run scripts located inskills/subdirectories. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch data from external sources including competitor blogs, LinkedIn, and Twitter/X.
- Evidence: The configuration in
Phase 0and the commands inPhases 1-3target external URLs and handles for scraping via the Apify API. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted content from the web and processes it to create a synthesized summary.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from external URLs (blogs) and social media profiles in
Phase 1,Phase 2, andPhase 3. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions in
Phase 4(Analyze & Synthesize) do not specify the use of delimiters or provide instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the scraped text. - Capability inventory: The skill allows for local shell command execution (
python3scripts) and file writes to theclients/directory. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the ingested content before it is passed to the LLM for synthesis.
Audit Metadata