newsletter-signal-scanner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for creating a persistence mechanism on the host system via a scheduled task.
- Evidence: The "Scheduling" section in
SKILL.mdexplicitly instructs the configuration of acrontabentry to execute code at regular intervals:0 7 * * 1 python3 run_skill.py newsletter-signal-scanner --client <client-name>. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external newsletter emails.
- Ingestion points:
agentmailcapability used to fetch raw email bodies from an external inbox (described in Phase 1 ofSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill extracts keyword context directly from email bodies and interpolates them into a markdown report without using XML tags, delimiters, or "ignore instruction" warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities, saving intelligence reports to the
clients/<client-name>/intelligence/directory. - Sanitization: The skill performs basic HTML-to-plain-text stripping, but lacks semantic sanitization to prevent embedded instructions in the newsletters from influencing the agent's logic during the digest creation or subsequent processing.
Audit Metadata