newsletter-signal-scanner

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for creating a persistence mechanism on the host system via a scheduled task.
  • Evidence: The "Scheduling" section in SKILL.md explicitly instructs the configuration of a crontab entry to execute code at regular intervals: 0 7 * * 1 python3 run_skill.py newsletter-signal-scanner --client <client-name>.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external newsletter emails.
  • Ingestion points: agentmail capability used to fetch raw email bodies from an external inbox (described in Phase 1 of SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill extracts keyword context directly from email bodies and interpolates them into a markdown report without using XML tags, delimiters, or "ignore instruction" warnings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities, saving intelligence reports to the clients/<client-name>/intelligence/ directory.
  • Sanitization: The skill performs basic HTML-to-plain-text stripping, but lacks semantic sanitization to prevent embedded instructions in the newsletters from influencing the agent's logic during the digest creation or subsequent processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 10, 2026, 03:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — newsletter-signal-scanner