blender-shot-planner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to write and modify Python scripts (
build_previs.py) which are then executed using a Blender binary. This dynamic script generation and execution pattern is the core functionality of the skill but represents a significant security surface. - Evidence found in
SKILL.md(Step 3: "Write or adapt this plan's Python") andreferences/blender-authoring.md(instructions for preflighting the Blender interpreter and modules). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, including director feedback, character/location sheets, and scene JSON files. This content is interpolated into revision descriptions and used to generate the parameters for the Python scripts, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
scene.json, director feedback (NL), and character sheets (directing-workflow.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly mentioned for prompt interpolation, though the skill mandates a "model-neutral description" review.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write files (
build_previs.py), execute shell commands (renku,blender,ffmpeg), and access the local filesystem. - Sanitization: Instructions recommend an "agent editorial review" of descriptions but do not specify technical sanitization for script parameters.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes external command-line interfaces and binaries, including a custom
renkuCLI,blender,ffmpeg, andffprobe. references/blender-authoring.mdinstructs the agent to preflight these binaries and handle output rendering/encoding via subprocess calls.SKILL.mdandreferences/directing-workflow.mdcontain specific instructions for using therenkuCLI tool, including warnings against inventing syntax or bypassing permission denials.
Audit Metadata