docx-editor-cn
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The module
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime usinggccinto a shared library. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyload the compiled C shared library into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This technique intercepts system-level socket calls and represents a form of process injection that could be abused to execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the office suite. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/accept_changes.pydynamically constructs a LibreOffice StarBasic macro and writes it to a temporary user profile (/tmp/libreoffice_docx_profile) to automate tracked changes acceptance. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (
scripts/formula.py,scripts/accept_changes.py,scripts/office/soffice.py) usesubprocess.runto execute external binary tools includingpandoc,gcc, andsofficewith arguments derived from runtime processing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points:
scripts/office/unpack.pyandscripts/new_doc.jsingest untrusted user content from.docx,.doc, and.mdfiles. - Boundary markers: Absent; file content is parsed and processed into XML structures without isolation from the agent's control context.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including binary compilation, library injection, and macro execution across multiple files.
- Sanitization: Basic XML entity escaping is present, but there is no structural sanitization or validation of embedded logic within the processed documents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata