kiro-impl
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from repository configuration and project specification files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads repository-local sources including
package.json,pyproject.toml,go.mod,Cargo.toml,Makefile,justfile,CI/workflow files, andREADME*to derive execution commands. It also readsrequirements.md,design.md, andtasks.mdto construct prompts for sub-agents. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or explicit 'ignore' instructions when processing data from these external files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (via derived test/build/smoke commands) and write to the file system (during TDD implementation and git commits).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is applied to the commands or content extracted from the repository files before execution or interpolation into sub-agent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill intentionally executes shell commands to automate the software development lifecycle. These commands are dynamically sourced from the repository's own configuration, creating a mechanism for code execution that is dependent on the integrity of the repository files.
Audit Metadata