agent-reach
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the installation of a Python package directly from a GitHub repository ZIP archive (
https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip). Installing code from unverified third-party repositories allows for the execution of arbitrary setup scripts and code during installation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The command
agent-reach install --env=autois designed to automatically detect the host environment and install multiple system dependencies and CLI tools (Node.js, mcporter, bird CLI, gh CLI). This automated provisioning of executables from an untrusted package represents a significant risk to the host environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches instructions from a non-trusted repository (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/main/docs/install.md) and recommends the installation of third-party browser extensions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The primary function of the skill is to ingest and process data from external, untrusted sources including Twitter/X, Reddit, YouTube transcripts, and arbitrary web pages.
- Ingestion points: The
agent-reach read <url>andagent-reach searchcommands inSKILL.mdare ingestion points for external content. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or delimiters to separate ingested content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to network operations and can execute various sub-commands of the
agent-reachCLI tool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the content retrieved from external URLs before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata