computer-use
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
setup-vnc.shscript executes multiple high-privilege commands usingsudoto install system packages, create systemd service units in/etc/systemd/system/, and modify the/usr/bin/xfdesktopsystem binary. These actions establish persistence and provide the skill with deep system integration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The VNC server configuration (specifically in
vnc_start.sh) initializesx11vncwith the-nopwflag, disabling password authentication. While it attempts to bind to the loopback interface, any misconfiguration or reuse of this pattern could expose the entire desktop environment to unauthorized remote control. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the Google Chrome stable package from a well-known source (
dl.google.com) and installs it viadpkg. This is documented as a neutral dependency installation for the intended browser automation functionality. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes arbitrary content from the virtual desktop without safety boundaries.
- Ingestion points: Screen content is captured via
screenshot.shand returned to the agent for interpretation. - Boundary markers: None. The agent receives raw visual data which may contain adversarial instructions from websites or documents opened in the virtual environment.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including administrative system modification via
sudoand full user-level automation viaxdotoolandxfce4-terminal. - Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the content displayed on screen before it is processed by the agent's vision model.
Audit Metadata