duckduckgo-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the user to install a Python package namedddgs(pip install ddgs). The official and widely recognized library for this purpose isduckduckgo-search. The skill explicitly and falsely claims that the package was renamed fromduckduckgo-searchtoddgs. This pattern is highly characteristic of a typosquatting or dependency confusion attack intended to trick users into installing a third-party package. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous Python examples that import from the suspect package (
from ddgs import DDGS) and execute its methods. If theddgspackage contains malicious logic, this would result in arbitrary code execution within the environment where the agent executes the code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a web search utility, the skill processes untrusted content from the internet (search titles and snippets). This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Search results returned by
ddgs.text(),ddgs.news(),ddgs.images(), andddgs.videos()as documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or system-level instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill encourages the use of
execute_codefor the search itself and suggests following up withweb_extractorcurlon the discovered URLs, providing a path for multi-step injection attacks. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of output sanitization or filtering to prevent the agent from obeying instructions found within search metadata.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata