google-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and possesses the capability to perform actions based on that data.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context in
scripts/google_api.pyviagmail_get(reading email bodies),docs_get(reading document content), anddrive_search(retrieving file metadata). - Boundary markers: While the instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly require the agent to confirm destructive actions with the user before execution, there are no technical boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the scripts themselves. - Capability inventory: The skill provides significant write capabilities in
scripts/google_api.py, includinggmail_send,gmail_reply,calendar_create,sheets_update, andsheets_append. - Sanitization: The scripts do not perform sanitization, filtering, or instruction-detection on the data retrieved from the Google APIs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup script performs localized environment management using shell commands.
- Evidence:
scripts/setup.pyusessubprocess.check_callto executepip installfor its dependencies. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads official libraries from public registries during its setup phase.
- Evidence: The
setup.pyscript installsgoogle-api-python-client,google-auth-oauthlib, andgoogle-auth-httplib2from the Python Package Index (PyPI).
Audit Metadata