skills/gr-i-niy/opentaint/debug-rule/Gen Agent Trust Hub

debug-rule

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the agent to execute shell commands (e.g., opentaint test rule reachability) using several variable parameters such as <model-dir>, <rules-dir>, <results-dir>, and <full-id>. These variables are sourced from caller inputs or environment defaults. Direct interpolation of these parameters into shell strings without explicit sanitization or validation instructions creates a risk of command injection if an attacker provides malicious input values.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by instructing the agent to read and process external data from files such as dropped-external-methods.yaml and SARIF reports (debug-ifds-fact-reachability.sarif). Malicious content within these files could attempt to influence the agent's diagnostic logic.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads dropped-external-methods.yaml and debug-ifds-fact-reachability.sarif to diagnose taint propagation gaps (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided in the workflow.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the opentaint CLI tool for dataflow analysis and reachability testing (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, escaping, or validation steps for the content of the external files being processed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 10:39 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — debug-rule