debug-rule
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the agent to execute shell commands (e.g.,
opentaint test rule reachability) using several variable parameters such as<model-dir>,<rules-dir>,<results-dir>, and<full-id>. These variables are sourced from caller inputs or environment defaults. Direct interpolation of these parameters into shell strings without explicit sanitization or validation instructions creates a risk of command injection if an attacker provides malicious input values. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by instructing the agent to read and process external data from files such as
dropped-external-methods.yamland SARIF reports (debug-ifds-fact-reachability.sarif). Malicious content within these files could attempt to influence the agent's diagnostic logic. - Ingestion points: The skill reads
dropped-external-methods.yamlanddebug-ifds-fact-reachability.sarifto diagnose taint propagation gaps (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided in the workflow.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
opentaintCLI tool for dataflow analysis and reachability testing (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, escaping, or validation steps for the content of the external files being processed.
Audit Metadata