review-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data in the form of pull request diffs and bodies authored by others. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in a pull request could attempt to influence the agent's review or summary.
- Ingestion points: Processes pull request diffs and content retrieved via
git showand/code-reviewtriggers. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not mandate the use of delimiters or 'ignore' markers when the agent processes the untrusted PR content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
gh apito write comments back to GitHub repositories and executes local commands likegitandmise. - Sanitization: While explicit sanitization of the PR content is not mentioned, the skill uses quoted heredocs (
<<'REVIEW_JSON') when assembling the API payload, which is a robust defense against shell command injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several shell commands to facilitate the review process, including
git fetch,git show,gh api, andmise run lint. - The use of
gh apiallows the agent to create public comments on GitHub repositories. - The skill mitigates risks in manual mode by requiring explicit user confirmation before posting ('Do not post without an explicit yes').
- In automated/CI mode, the skill increases autonomy by posting without asking, though it limits the number of findings to reduce noise.
Audit Metadata