slo-investigate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes content from external sources including Grafana SLO definitions and GitHub runbooks. This presents a surface for indirect prompt injection if the external data contains instructions designed to manipulate the agent.
- Ingestion points: Runbook content is fetched via the GitHub API (
gh api) in SKILL.md; SLO definitions are retrieved via the Grafana Cloud CLI (gcx). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or clear separation between system instructions and untrusted external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is allowed to use the
Bashtool, which permits execution of shell commands likegcxandgh. - Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement for the agent to sanitize or validate the fetched content before displaying excerpts or using it for diagnostic summaries.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation from GitHub to provide runbook excerpts for troubleshooting.
- Evidence: It uses the
gh apitool to fetch contents from repositories defined in the SLO metadata as seen in Step 6 of SKILL.md. - Context: The downloads target well-known services (GitHub) and are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of diagnosing infrastructure alerts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several command-line utilities to perform its diagnostic workflow.
- Evidence: It uses
gcxfor Grafana operations,ghfor GitHub interactions, andjqfor JSON processing throughout SKILL.md. - Context: All commands are scoped within the legitimate operations needed to investigate SLO breaches as described in the skill metadata.
Audit Metadata