slo-manage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests existing SLO definitions and configuration from the Grafana environment to perform updates and GitOps synchronization. If a malicious actor embeds instructions within SLO metadata fields (such as names, descriptions, or alert annotations) in the Grafana instance, these instructions could influence the agent during the YAML processing phase.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflows 2 and 3) utilizesgcx slo definitions getandgcx slo definitions pullto import data from Grafana APIs into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ specific boundary markers or "ignore instructions" headers when processing the imported YAML content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool for executing CLI commands (including network-capablegcxpush/delete operations) and theWritetool for file modifications. - Sanitization: The skill relies on structural YAML formatting but does not explicitly sanitize string fields for embedded agent instructions before processing.
Audit Metadata