formalize-request
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes sibling tool scripts (memory, interview, lean4-prove) using
subprocess.runwith argument lists. This method avoids shell interpretation of user-provided strings, mitigating command injection risks. Evidence:subprocess.run([MEMORY_RUN] + [str(a) for a in args], ...)informalize.py.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Logic from thelean4-provesibling skill is imported at runtime by modifyingsys.path. This is a localized integration pattern within the authorized skill ecosystem for retrieving similar proofs. Evidence:sys.path.insert(0, str(LEAN4_PROVE_SKILL))informalize.py.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied natural language requests, creating an ingestion point for potential indirect injection. However, its function is to clarify intent through a structured loop, limiting the risk of malicious instructions reaching downstream tools. Ingestion point:requestparameter informalize.py. Boundary markers: Absent. Capability inventory: Subprocess calls and temporary file creation. Sanitization: Regex pattern matching.
Audit Metadata