ingest-audiobook
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Shell scripts
run.shandrun-faster.shgenerate Python code at runtime using heredocs to interpolate local file paths into the script. This pattern is vulnerable to code injection if a file in the processing inbox has a maliciously crafted name designed to escape the string context. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically downloads and executes external software packages including
audible-cli,openai-whisper, andfaster-whisperviauvxandpipduring runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of
subprocessand direct shell calls to manage system utilities such asffmpeg,ffprobe,nvidia-smi,pgrep, andxargsfor decryption, media conversion, and pipeline monitoring. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
memory_integration.pymodule usesimportlib.utilto dynamically load Python code from computed local file paths. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches external content including encrypted audiobooks from Audible (requiring user authentication) and model weights for the Whisper transcription engine. References to documentation for the well-known Coqui TTS service are also included.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text data from audiobooks and YouTube lore transcripts (ingestion points in
transcribe_runner.pyandyoutube_lore_downloader.py). This ingested data is used to populate memory and influence agent personality without explicit sanitization or boundary markers, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection that could leverage the agent's Bash tool capabilities.
Recommendations
- Contains 2 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata