train-voice
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
iterative.pyconstructs Python code as a string and executes it usingsubprocess.runwith the-cflag. This string contains thephrasevariable interpolated from the--eval-phrasescommand-line argument. This pattern is vulnerable to Python code injection if an attacker can influence the input provided to the training command. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data by transcribing audio from YouTube using OpenAI Whisper in
train.py. The transcripts are stored in JSONL manifests and processed during training without explicit sanitization or boundary markers. This creates a surface where malicious instructions spoken in the source audio could potentially influence the agent when it reads the resulting files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple files including
train.py,design.py,iterative.py, andbatch_train.pymake frequent use ofsubprocess.runto execute shell commands. These calls are used for audio processing viaffmpeg, process management withpgrep, and orchestrating training phases withpythonanduv. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to download audio from YouTube (
train.py) and ML models from Hugging Face (sft_12hz.pyanditerative.py). While these are well-known services relevant to the skill's ML purpose, they represent external data dependencies.
Audit Metadata