demo-scaffolding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the official Docker installation script from Docker's public domain for environment setup.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | shintemplates/scripts/deploy.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The generated infrastructure utilizes shell commands for container orchestration and automated testing of agent skills.
- Evidence: Use of
subprocess.runto call theclaudeCLI intemplates/demo-container/skill-test.py. - Evidence: Use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag intemplates/demo-container/entrypoint.shandautoplay.shto facilitate automated demo interactions in a sandboxed environment. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Implements secure credential management practices for generated demo environments.
- Evidence: Sensitive API tokens and OAuth tokens are passed to demo containers via temporary environment files with restricted file system permissions (
0o600). - Evidence: Uses industry-standard
.envtemplates and gitignore rules for credential isolation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The generated demo infrastructure includes an indirect prompt injection surface where scenario files are processed as agent input.
- Ingestion points: Prompts are loaded from user-defined
.promptsfiles in thescenarios/directory. - Boundary markers: None present in the generated templates.
- Capability inventory: The container environment has permissions to execute CLI commands and make network requests to configured product APIs.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on the prompt content before processing by the agent.
Audit Metadata