gitlab-mr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executeglabCLI commands. Multiple examples (e.g.,glab mr merge 123 --yes,glab mr create --fill --yes) include flags that explicitly skip confirmation prompts, which increases agent autonomy and reduces human oversight for significant or destructive repository operations (SKILL.md). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface where external data from merge requests could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
glab mr view <id>andglab mr list, which fetch titles, descriptions, and comments from GitLab merge requests (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to treat fetched MR content as untrusted data or to use specific delimiters to isolate external content from its own instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform sensitive actions likeglab mr merge,glab mr approve, andglab mr delete(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitizing or filtering the fetched content to remove potential instructions before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata