gitlab-mr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute glab CLI commands. Multiple examples (e.g., glab mr merge 123 --yes, glab mr create --fill --yes) include flags that explicitly skip confirmation prompts, which increases agent autonomy and reduces human oversight for significant or destructive repository operations (SKILL.md).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface where external data from merge requests could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through glab mr view <id> and glab mr list, which fetch titles, descriptions, and comments from GitLab merge requests (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to treat fetched MR content as untrusted data or to use specific delimiters to isolate external content from its own instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform sensitive actions like glab mr merge, glab mr approve, and glab mr delete (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitizing or filtering the fetched content to remove potential instructions before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 07:08 AM