website-preflight
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands using parameters retrieved from
site-config.json. Specifically, fields like<aws.profile>,<client.email>, and<aws.domain>are interpolated directly into bash command strings (e.g.,aws route53 list-hosted-zones-by-name --dns-name <aws.domain> --profile <aws.profile>). If an attacker modifies the configuration file to include shell metacharacters (e.g.,; rm -rf /), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local scripts (
bootstrap.shandvalidate-stack.sh) found within the path specified by the$TOOLKIT_DIRvariable. This variable is read dynamically from thesite-config.jsonfile. While this is functional for the toolkit, it allows for the execution of arbitrary code if the configuration is pointed toward a malicious directory. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill executes
aws sts get-caller-identity, which retrieves and displays the AWS Account ID and IAM User ARN. While necessary for the preflight check to confirm credentials, users should be aware that this sensitive metadata is processed by the agent and recorded in the report. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from a configuration file and command-line arguments to drive its logic and shell operations.
- Ingestion points: Reads
site-config.jsonand$ARGUMENTS(SKILL.md, Steps 1 and 2). - Boundary markers: None observed; values are interpolated directly into instructions and commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
Bashaccess to the system and uses it to run AWS CLI tools and local scripts. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping for configuration values before they are used in shell execution blocks.
Audit Metadata