honey
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
npx pxpipe-proxyand mentions an externalesoncodec. Usingnpxinvolves downloading and running code from the npm registry at runtime, which is a significant security risk if the package is unverified. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill mandates the use of shell commands for state management and data optimization, including
node -eand piping data toeson stashandeson crush. These commands give the agent broad execution capabilities. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The state-toggling feature uses a complex
node -ecommand that dynamically loads and executes a script (honey-state.js) using internal Node.js APIs (runMain). The script path is constructed and modified at runtime. - [OBFUSCATION]: The
node -ecommand utilizesString.fromCharCode(92)to represent a backslash character. While likely intended for cross-platform path compatibility, using character codes instead of literal characters is a common technique to evade static analysis filters. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'PX' (image-rendered reads) feature suggests converting large amounts of text into PNG images for the agent to 'skim'. This unconventional data ingestion method creates a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in visual data, potentially bypassing text-based safety layers.
- Ingestion points: External files or command outputs converted to PNG via
pxpipe-proxy(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None mentioned for the image-based data ingestion.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution, file system access, and
npxremote execution capabilities are present across the skill instructions. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the input files is described before they are passed to the image conversion process.
Audit Metadata