flag-experiment
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct shell commands by interpolating user-provided inputs, such as
<flag-id>and<experiment-id>, directly into command strings for thegb-calltool. This pattern presents a potential risk of shell command injection if the user-supplied identifiers contain shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes external data from the GrowthBook API, which could contain instructions aimed at manipulating the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context through the responses of
gb-call GET /api/v2/features/<flag-id>andgb-call GET /api/v1/experiments/<experiment-id>(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are employed to isolate the data retrieved from the API from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to execute shell commands via the
gb-callscript to modify flag rules and configurations (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill does not specify any sanitization, validation, or escaping procedures for the content returned by the API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata