icp-onboarding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface by scraping and processing content from external websites supplied by the user.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md(Step 1), the agent reads raw text content from/tmp/scrape.jsongenerated by the website scraping script. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no protective delimiters or specific instructions isolating the untrusted website content from the main system context.
- Capability inventory: The capability is limited to running the local website scraper via
npx tsxand creating a structured profile file (client-profile.yaml). No administrative or sensitive network write-back operations are exposed. - Sanitization: Absent. The script
scripts/scrape-website.tsuses regex to remove HTML markup tags, but passes all underlying text content verbatim into the JSON output without further validation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
SKILL.md(Step 1), the skill instructs the agent to invoke a local script using shell commands:npx tsx scripts/scrape-website.ts --url=https://example.com --out=/tmp/scrape.json. Interpolating user-supplied input directly into a command line template creates an injection surface if the executing agent platform doesn't adequately sanitize arguments before shell execution.
Audit Metadata