list-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches text from external, untrusted websites (company homepages and team pages) to perform lead qualification using an LLM. This represents an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Website text is scraped in
scripts/classify-batch.ts,scripts/multi-lane-classify.ts, andscripts/solo-teampage.ts. - Boundary markers: The prompts use
---andEVIDENCE:delimiters to separate external content from instructions. - Capability inventory: The LLM's classification determines whether domains are qualified, rescued from rejection, or enriched with further data.
- Sanitization: Content is truncated to 3,200 or 12,000 characters but is not explicitly sanitized for embedded instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator scripts (
run-lane.ts,snowball.ts,contacts.ts) usespawnandexecSyncto manage a multi-stage pipeline by executing subordinate scripts within the same package. - Scripts executed: Includes
lookalikes.ts,pull.ts,score-batch.ts,verify-website.ts,enrich-domains.ts,contact-count.ts, andpush-sheet.py. - Safety check: These are local scripts identified by path and are necessary for the skill's complex operational model.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill retrieves API keys from the local environment and specifically reads the platform configuration file at
~/.claude.jsonto find credentials for the GetLeads service. - File access:
scripts/getleads-client.tsreads~/.claude.jsonto extract Authorization headers. - [REMOTE_SERVICE_INTERACTION]: The skill interacts with several external APIs for its core functionality.
- Services:
api.openai.com(qualification),api.prospeo.io(discovery),app.getleads.io(contact counts), and Google Sheets API (delivery). All are well-known services relevant to the skill's purpose.
Audit Metadata