blender-core

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/run_in_blender.py uses subprocess.run to invoke the Blender binary for headless operations.\n
  • Evidence: Line 85 in scripts/run_in_blender.py executes a command constructed from environment paths and user-provided script arguments.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary Python code within the Blender environment through several mechanisms.\n
  • Evidence: scripts/run_in_blender.py includes a --expr flag that passes user-defined strings directly to Blender's --python-expr parameter.\n
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to use importlib.reload to dynamically update and execute scripts during live sessions.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a vulnerability surface where untrusted data could influence agent actions or system state by injecting malicious instructions into processed Blender code.\n
  • Ingestion points: The run_in_blender.py script and the live MCP execute_blender_code tool ingest strings that are executed as Python code within the Blender process.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or 'ignore' directives for data processed by these tools to distinguish between intended code and embedded instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via subprocess and has full access to the local machine's filesystem and networking capabilities via the standard Python and Blender bpy APIs.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or sandboxing logic to prevent malicious code from being injected into the Blender execution context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 8, 2026, 09:37 PM