blender-core
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run_in_blender.pyusessubprocess.runto invoke the Blender binary for headless operations.\n - Evidence: Line 85 in
scripts/run_in_blender.pyexecutes a command constructed from environment paths and user-provided script arguments.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary Python code within the Blender environment through several mechanisms.\n - Evidence:
scripts/run_in_blender.pyincludes a--exprflag that passes user-defined strings directly to Blender's--python-exprparameter.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to useimportlib.reloadto dynamically update and execute scripts during live sessions.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a vulnerability surface where untrusted data could influence agent actions or system state by injecting malicious instructions into processed Blender code.\n - Ingestion points: The
run_in_blender.pyscript and the live MCPexecute_blender_codetool ingest strings that are executed as Python code within the Blender process.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or 'ignore' directives for data processed by these tools to distinguish between intended code and embedded instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
subprocessand has full access to the local machine's filesystem and networking capabilities via the standard Python and BlenderbpyAPIs.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or sandboxing logic to prevent malicious code from being injected into the Blender execution context.
Audit Metadata