deep-research
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the
~/.claude/memory/directory to retrieve prior research and context. This path is used by the agent to store sensitive history of user interactions and persona data. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to utilize a sensitive environment variable,
$NOTION_API_KEY, for authentication and data retrieval from external Notion workspaces. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and synthesizes data from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from arbitrary URLs, Google search results, and social media platforms (Reddit, X, YouTube, HN) via
WebSearch,WebFetch, and theagent-browsertool. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" directives to prevent the agent from following malicious commands hidden in the fetched web content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to perform file system operations (reading/writing to
~/.config/makerskills/), execute shell searches (grep), and communicate with the external Notion API. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the content retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Performs network requests to non-whitelisted domains to fetch web content and search results.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell-level commands like
grepto search local memory and archive files, and creates directories usingmkdirat~/.config/makerskills/deep-research/archive/.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata