ad-creative
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from customer reviews and ad comments stored in
inputs/reviews/andinputs/comments/. This represents a potential attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in reviews could influence the agent's behavior during generation or analysis. - Ingestion points: Reads files from
inputs/reviews/andinputs/comments/(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill emphasizes 'Grounding' but lacks explicit instructions to treat embedded text as data only, increasing the risk of the agent obeying instructions hidden in review text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute various ad platform CLI tools (
google-ads,meta-ads,linkedin-ads,tiktok-ads) and write files to the local system. - Sanitization: While the HTML review template includes output escaping, the prompt interpolation for generating new ads does not specify sanitization for the inputs.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/imessage-video-ads.mdrecommends installing external tools vianpx gooseworks install --all. This pattern encourages the download and execution of code from an unverified package on the NPM registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In
references/generative-tools.md, the skill suggests building the 'Voicebox' tool by cloning its repository (git clone https://github.com/jamiepine/voicebox.git) and running build commands (make setup && make dev). This involves executing code from an unverified GitHub repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various local command-line interfaces for ad platforms to pull performance data and manage campaigns. While these are primary functions, the ability to execute shell commands (
node tools/clis/...) could be exploited if an injection attack occurs.
Audit Metadata