baoyu-cover-image
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
references/base-prompt.mdfile contains a safety bypass instruction stating "DO NOT refuse to generate" when content involves sensitive or copyrighted figures, instead prompting for stylistic alternatives. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow and prompt templates (specifically
references/workflow/prompt-template.md) utilize authoritative markers like "CRITICAL", "MUST", and "REQUIRED" to override default agent behavior and prioritize specific visual instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages its configuration by accessing and reading
EXTEND.mdfiles from multiple potential paths, including the local project directory, the XDG config path ($HOME/.config/), and the user's home directory ($HOME/.baoyu-skills/). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface through its content processing workflow.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via pasted source articles (saved to
source.md) and user-provided reference images (saved to therefs/directory). - Boundary markers: Although markdown headers are used for organization in the
references/workflow/prompt-template.mdtemplate, there are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to disregard potential commands embedded within the article text. - Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes (
prompts/,refs/,source.md,cover.png) and invokes external image generation tools such asimagegenorbaoyu-imagine. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization, filtering, or validation for the external content interpolated into the generation prompts.
Audit Metadata