baoyu-translate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from user-provided URLs and files. It lacks explicit boundary markers or delimiters in the templates used to spawn translation subagents (documented in
references/subagent-prompt-template.md). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the source material could potentially influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: External URLs, local files, and inline text (see
references/workflow-mechanics.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (
bun), file system read/write access for intermediate chunks, and network access for content fetching. - Sanitization: No evidence of content sanitization or instruction filtering was found.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches article content from arbitrary external URLs provided by the user to perform translations, which is its primary functional purpose.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local TypeScript scripts (
scripts/main.tsandscripts/chunk.ts) using the Bun runtime to handle markdown document chunking and metadata processing.
Audit Metadata