baoyu-youtube-transcript
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/youtube.tsexecutes theyt-dlputility (or alternatives likeuvxorpython3 -m yt_dlp) usingchild_process.spawnSync. - The execution includes the
--remote-components ejs:githubflag, which allowsyt-dlpto fetch and use extractor components from remote GitHub repositories. - It also uses the
--js-runtimes bunflag to execute JavaScript-based extractors. - The command can optionally ingest browser cookies through the
YOUTUBE_TRANSCRIPT_COOKIES_FROM_BROWSERenvironment variable to bypass bot detection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to YouTube's InnerTube API (
youtube.com/youtubei/v1/player) and fetches thumbnails fromi.ytimg.com. While these are well-known services, the skill downloads external data that is later processed as text. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted transcription data from YouTube and passes it to an LLM for formatting and speaker identification.
- Ingestion points: Raw YouTube transcripts and video descriptions are loaded in
scripts/main.tsand processed using the instructions inprompts/speaker-transcript.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses YAML frontmatter and Markdown headers to structure the data, but the transcript content itself lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the local file system (
writeFileSync) and execute theyt-dlpcommand via the provided scripts. - Sanitization: The scripts implement basic HTML entity unescaping and tag stripping in
scripts/shared.ts, which mitigates basic XSS-like patterns but not natural language instructions.
Audit Metadata