using-superpowers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong, coercive language in
SKILL.mdto force compliance and override the agent's default decision-making process. Phrases such as 'YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE', 'This is not negotiable', and 'You cannot rationalize your way out of this' are designed to suppress agent autonomy. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a 'Red Flags' section that explicitly instructs the agent to ignore its own internal reasoning (e.g., 'I need more context first', 'The skill is overkill') in favor of mandatory skill invocation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a significant indirect prompt injection surface by instructing the agent to load and prioritize behavior-modifying instructions from various external files and directories.
- Ingestion points: Project-level instruction files (
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,GEMINI.md,TODO.md) and user-local skill directories (~/.claude/skills/,~/.agents/skills/,~/.copilot/skills/). - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions; the skill explicitly states these files 'override default behavior'.
- Capability inventory: The reference files map these instructions to powerful capabilities including shell execution (
Bash,run_shell_command), file modification (Edit,apply_patch), and subagent dispatch (Agent,invoke_agent). - Sanitization: No sanitization or verification protocols are defined for the instructions ingested from these sources.
Audit Metadata