wechat-post-publisher
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically imports JavaScript code at runtime from a remote CDN (
cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com) to provide syntax highlighting for different programming languages. This creates a vector where unverified remote code is executed within the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (
paste-from-clipboard.ts,copy-to-clipboard.ts,check-permissions.ts) execute system-level commands across different platforms. This includesosascriptandswifton macOS,powershell.exeon Windows, andxdotoolorydotoolon Linux. These are used for clipboard automation and environment verification. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read sensitive credential files, specifically
.envand~/.super-publisher/.env, to retrieve WeChat API credentials (app_idandapp_secret). While necessary for the skill's purpose, this pattern involves the handling and transmission of secrets to external WeChat APIs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads remote images referenced in Markdown files and fetches content from external services like
plantuml.comand a custom CDN for syntax highlighting logic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a data pipeline that ingests local Markdown files and transforms them into HTML for injection into a browser-based editor. This ingestion surface could potentially be used to inject malicious HTML or instructions into the target web application if the source files are not controlled by the user.
Audit Metadata