pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from repository files and pull request comments, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads files in the repository to re-baseline (SKILL.md Step 1) and fetches pull request comments using
gh pr view --commentsduring the review loop (SKILL.md Step 8).\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the files or comments it reads.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, allowing it to executegitcommands (commit, push),ghcommands (create, merge PRs), and arbitrary shell commands defined in the repository's verification gates (SKILL.md Step 6).\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external content is performed before it is processed by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands defined in the repository's configuration file, which is the intended behavior for running build and test gates.\n
- Evidence: Step 6 in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runinstall,type-check,lint,test, andbuildcommands defined in the.claude/git-workflow.mdfile.\n - Evidence: The verification logic in
references/merge.mdexecutes thetypecheck gatecommand in a bash loop to verify individual commits.
Audit Metadata