ship
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell commands to interact with the local environment and GitHub, including
git status,git log,git rev-list, andgh pr create. These are standard tools for the skill's primary purpose of development workflow automation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches issue details and titles from GitHub using
gh issue view. This interaction targets a well-known service (GitHub) to retrieve context necessary for drafting Pull Requests. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources that could be controlled by third parties, such as commit messages and GitHub issue bodies.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested in Step 2 and Step 4 via
git logandgh issue viewto retrieve slice references and issue content. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the fetched content as potentially untrusted data when interpolating it into the PR body template.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (
gh pr create) and invoke other analysis skills (/code-review,/critique). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of specific sanitization or filtering applied to the retrieved issue or commit content before it is used in prompt construction.
- Mitigation: The risk is significantly reduced by mandatory human-in-the-loop (HITL) gates in Step 3 and Step 4, where the user must manually approve review findings and the final PR draft before the PR is created.
Audit Metadata