triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from GitHub issue bodies and comments which could contain instructions to override agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Step 1 of Triage) instructs the agent to read the full issue, including bodies and comments provided by external users. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks boundary markers or instructions to treat issue content as data rather than instructions when gathering context or recommending states.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write files to the repository (in
.out-of-scope/), post comments on GitHub, and modify issue labels/status. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the ingested issue content is mentioned before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata