ask-jev
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill requires access to an API key stored at
~/.config/typesafe/typesafe-key.header. The instructions explicitly direct the agent to check for the file's existence without reading its contents into the conversation, preventing accidental leakage. The key is only used locally as a header forcurlrequests to the official vendor API (api.typesafe.ai). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands including
nodeto run its internalpack-requests.mjsscript andcurlto interact with the TypeSafe API. These are necessary for the skill's stated purpose of processing data and communicating with the model. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external content from Figma designs (spec notes, node IDs) and source code.
- Ingestion points: Figma node data, spec notes, and project source files (SKILL.md, Step 2).
- Boundary markers: Uses structured JSON formats and markdown headers to separate data, and requires English 'glosses' for translated text.
- Capability inventory: File system access for reading sources and writing to a temporary run folder, and network access via
curlto the vendor API. - Sanitization: The
pack-requests.mjsscript performs strict JSON validation and image header parsing but does not sanitize the text content of questions or facts against adversarial instruction patterns.
Audit Metadata