skills/guojie-hong/skills/ask-jev/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ask-jev

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill requires access to an API key stored at ~/.config/typesafe/typesafe-key.header. The instructions explicitly direct the agent to check for the file's existence without reading its contents into the conversation, preventing accidental leakage. The key is only used locally as a header for curl requests to the official vendor API (api.typesafe.ai).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands including node to run its internal pack-requests.mjs script and curl to interact with the TypeSafe API. These are necessary for the skill's stated purpose of processing data and communicating with the model.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external content from Figma designs (spec notes, node IDs) and source code.
  • Ingestion points: Figma node data, spec notes, and project source files (SKILL.md, Step 2).
  • Boundary markers: Uses structured JSON formats and markdown headers to separate data, and requires English 'glosses' for translated text.
  • Capability inventory: File system access for reading sources and writing to a temporary run folder, and network access via curl to the vendor API.
  • Sanitization: The pack-requests.mjs script performs strict JSON validation and image header parsing but does not sanitize the text content of questions or facts against adversarial instruction patterns.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 03:17 PM