search-youtube
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, untrusted content from video platforms to generate research reports, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and synthesize video transcripts, titles, and descriptions fetched via the
transcriptandmetadatasubcommands (defined inSKILL.mdand implemented inscripts/yt_research.py).\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters (e.g., XML tags or clear warnings) to help the agent distinguish between its own system instructions and potentially malicious instructions embedded within video transcripts.\n
- Capability inventory: During the research process, the agent has access to powerful tools including
Task(for spawning sub-agents),Bash(for shell execution), andWebSearch(for external queries).\n - Sanitization: While the
yt_research.pyscript cleans technical subtitle tags (VTT/SRT), it does not sanitize the natural language content for injection patterns before passing it to the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of shell commands by wrapping theyt-dlpbinary.\n - Evidence: The
run_ytdlpfunction inscripts/yt_research.pyusessubprocess.run()to execute commands. Although it correctly uses a list-based argument structure and avoidsshell=True, it remains a mechanism for dynamic command execution based on agent-provided inputs.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is built to download data from external video hosting platforms.\n - Details: It fetches transcripts, metadata, and audio files from services like YouTube, Vimeo, and Twitter. These operations rely on the
yt-dlpdependency as specified in the usage instructions andreferences/platforms.md.
Audit Metadata