web-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/tavily_search.shaccesses the sensitive directory~/.mcp-auth/to read authentication tokens from*_tokens.jsonfiles. This involves local credential harvesting to facilitate API calls. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/tavily_search.shutilizesnpx -y mcp-remoteto download and execute code from the npm registry as a fallback mechanism for triggering OAuth flows. While targeting the well-known Tavily service, this represents dynamic package execution at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external web sources which may contain malicious instructions designed to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Web search results (titles, snippets, and summary content) retrieved from multiple external APIs including Baidu, Tavily, Brave, and Exa.
- Boundary markers: Output results are delimited by plain-text headers (e.g.,
--- Result 1 ---), which may not be sufficient to prevent an LLM from interpreting embedded instructions as its own. - Capability inventory: The agent utilizing this skill typically possesses high-privilege capabilities such as file system modification and shell command execution.
- Sanitization: The skill returns retrieved web content directly to the agent without filtering or sanitizing for natural language instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts within the
scripts/directory usecurlto transmit data to external APIs andjqfor parsing responses. Specifically,scripts/tavily_search.shincludes logic to start background processes usingnpx.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata