skills/gusibi/skills/web-search/Gen Agent Trust Hub

web-search

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script scripts/tavily_search.sh accesses the sensitive directory ~/.mcp-auth/ to read authentication tokens from *_tokens.json files. This involves local credential harvesting to facilitate API calls.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script scripts/tavily_search.sh utilizes npx -y mcp-remote to download and execute code from the npm registry as a fallback mechanism for triggering OAuth flows. While targeting the well-known Tavily service, this represents dynamic package execution at runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external web sources which may contain malicious instructions designed to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Web search results (titles, snippets, and summary content) retrieved from multiple external APIs including Baidu, Tavily, Brave, and Exa.
  • Boundary markers: Output results are delimited by plain-text headers (e.g., --- Result 1 ---), which may not be sufficient to prevent an LLM from interpreting embedded instructions as its own.
  • Capability inventory: The agent utilizing this skill typically possesses high-privilege capabilities such as file system modification and shell command execution.
  • Sanitization: The skill returns retrieved web content directly to the agent without filtering or sanitizing for natural language instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts within the scripts/ directory use curl to transmit data to external APIs and jq for parsing responses. Specifically, scripts/tavily_search.sh includes logic to start background processes using npx.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 11:30 PM