manimgl-best-practices

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Template files designed for user modification (templates/basic_scene.py, templates/3d_scene.py, and templates/math_scene.py) include os.system() calls within if __name__ == "__main__": blocks. These are implemented to automatically invoke the manimgl command-line tool on the file itself, allowing users to render animations by running the script directly with Python.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references image textures hosted on Wikimedia Commons (e.g., in rules/3d.md and templates/3d_scene.py) which are downloaded at runtime by the TexturedSurface class to skin 3D objects like spheres.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection due to its combination of untrusted data handling and powerful capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read, copy, and modify template files (templates/*.py) and rulesets provided in the skill.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the code it processes.
  • Capability inventory: The provided scripts include shell command execution via os.system and demonstrate the use of self.embed(), which drops the user into an interactive IPython shell allowing arbitrary code execution.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not suggest any filtering or escaping of the content before the agent interpolates it into its workflow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 13, 2026, 12:09 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — manimgl-best-practices