manimgl-best-practices
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Template files designed for user modification (
templates/basic_scene.py,templates/3d_scene.py, andtemplates/math_scene.py) includeos.system()calls withinif __name__ == "__main__":blocks. These are implemented to automatically invoke themanimglcommand-line tool on the file itself, allowing users to render animations by running the script directly with Python. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references image textures hosted on Wikimedia Commons (e.g., in
rules/3d.mdandtemplates/3d_scene.py) which are downloaded at runtime by theTexturedSurfaceclass to skin 3D objects like spheres. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection due to its combination of untrusted data handling and powerful capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read, copy, and modify template files (
templates/*.py) and rulesets provided in the skill. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the code it processes.
- Capability inventory: The provided scripts include shell command execution via
os.systemand demonstrate the use ofself.embed(), which drops the user into an interactive IPython shell allowing arbitrary code execution. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not suggest any filtering or escaping of the content before the agent interpolates it into its workflow.
Audit Metadata