second-opinion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to ingest a 'packet' containing code changes and evidence, and to include this text directly in the prompt of a reviewer agent. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the reviewed code contains malicious instructions meant to override the reviewer's logic.
- Ingestion points: The 'packet' output generated by
gate.py brief(referenced in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions suggest including the raw text directly in the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
gate.pyand invokes sub-agents (reviewer and refuter) which may have their own tool capabilities. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the packet content is described.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local shell scripts and Python utilities to perform its core functions.
- Evidence: SKILL.md invokes
gate.py briefandgate.py record. The filescripts/review-guard.shis a shell script that performs file system operations (cp, mkdir, rm) and executesgit statusto manage project snapshots.
Audit Metadata