hunt-idor

Crown Jewel Targets

IDOR (renamed BOLA in OWASP API1:2023) is the highest-frequency, second-highest-value bug class in modern bug bounty after RCE. ~40% of API attacks observed across production environments are BOLA per published research (Snyk 2026 Feb analysis). The 24-month meta has shifted decisively toward six asset types. All CVEs below are NVD-verified.

1. Multi-tenant SaaS with client-supplied tenant context (CVSS 9.9 territory). Every "send the tenant_id in the request" architecture is a candidate. CVE-2026-30956 (OneUptime — is-multi-tenant-query header bypass + projectid header override → cross-tenant data exposure → reset token leak → ATO; GHSA-r5v6-2599-9g3m, CVSS 9.9 critical) is the canonical 2026 example. CVE-2026-32131 (Zitadel Management API — low-priv project.read token reads other tenant's OIDC config; GHSA-wr6r-59xg-4pj2, affects 4.x through 4.12.1, 3.x through 3.4.7, 2.x through 2.71.19). CVE-2025-64431 (Zitadel V2Beta Organization API — admin in Org A reads/modifies/deletes Org B; GHSA-cpf4-pmr4-w6cx, CVSS 8.7, fix in 4.6.3). Hunt header tenant injection on every multi-tenant target: Tenantid, X-Org-Id, X-Tenant-ID, X-Project-Id, environmentId, is-multi-tenant-query, channel. The OnSecurity disclosure ("How a single HTTP header unlocked every customer's data") documents the pattern in textbook form — Tenantid: 3 to Tenantid: 2 with no other change.

2. Automotive / connected-vehicle platforms (six-figure-impact territory). Sam Curry's pattern. Kia 2024 disclosure (samcurry.net/hacking-kia, Sep 2024) — dealer portal channel header manipulation → cross-account access → vehicle PII (name, phone, email, address) → silent secondary-user addition → remote unlock/start/track on any post-2013 Kia by license plate alone in 30 seconds. Hyundai/Genesis/Honda/Nissan/Infiniti/Acura 2022-2023 (samcurry.net/web-hackers-vs-the-auto-industry) — same chain class against the entire auto industry. Ferrari 2023 — full ATO + admin CMS access via IDOR on customer records + back-office endpoints. Hunt: dealer portals, fleet management APIs, telematics endpoints, OTA update orchestrators, EV charging networks. Bounties paid through automaker private programs and HackerOne IBB; impact framing pays mid-to-high five-figure when chained to physical vehicle control.

3. GraphQL field-level / nested-object pivot (low-to-mid five-figure on enterprise SaaS). GraphQL's resolver model means every field needs its own auth check, and most schemas miss them. HackerOne $12,500 bounty Dec 2025 (Harshdranjan, documented by Monika Sharma writeup) — certificationId change in mutation deletes other users' Licenses & Certifications on hackerone.com itself. $1,500 GraphQL field-level Feb 2026 (tinopreter Medium writeup) — GetOrgWebhooks query returns webhooks the user shouldn't see because field-level perms missing on Project accessed via Organization parent. Yasser Hamoda April 2025 writeup — unauthenticated GraphQL user(username:"victim") returns admin email/role with no auth. The pattern: any GraphQL endpoint where authentication is checked but field-level/object-level authorization isn't. Pivot endpoints: me, user, organization, project, workflow, team. Mutation IDOR (delete/update by ID) pays more than query IDOR.

4. AI/ML platforms with cross-tenant model/data access. New 2025-2026 surface, well-paying. GHSA-3xx2-mqjm-hg9x (Paperclip Apr 2026, CVSS 10.0) — board user in Company A mints agent API keys for any agent in Company B via /agents/:id/keys, then operates as that agent inside victim tenant — full cross-tenant compromise. GHSA-gc8m-w37w-24hw (FastGPT) — authenticated team accesses and executes any appId on /api/v1/chat/completions regardless of team ownership. GHSA-2f4c-vrjq-rcgv (Tencent WeKnora) — missing tenant_id WHERE clause in DB query tool exposes all tenants' API keys, model configs, private messages cross-tenant. The pattern: AI inference / agent management endpoints checking authentication but skipping tenant scoping.

5. Government & enterprise legacy assets (DoD VDP through low five-figure on paid programs). The H1 2024-2026 hacktivity is full of "IDOR exposes PII of tens of thousands" reports against forgotten asset surfaces. The 2026 Air Force candidate PII + recruitment chat logs disclosure (H1 critical) is a textbook example. Hunt: legacy CMS, candidate/recruitment portals, support ticket systems, file-upload migration endpoints, document-share systems.

6. Apache Answer / Q&A / forum platforms with predictable token surface. CVE-2024-45719 (Apache Answer through 1.4.0, GHSA-mr95-vfcf-fx9p) — UUIDv1 timestamp-based tokens predict-by-arithmetic. The bananabr GitHub Security Lab disclosure (issue #816, paid via HackerOne #2513301 with linked bounty) introduced the CodeQL queries that catch this pattern systematically across JS/Python codebases. Hunt: any password reset, email confirmation, magic-link, or share-token implementation using UUIDv1 (timestamp-based) instead of UUIDv4 (random). The CodeQL query identifies sinks where uuid.uuid1() (Python) or uuidv1() (Node) flows into a token attribute — re-run against any in-scope OSS target.

Financial APIs with per-account state IDOR. Sri Sowmya Nemani Sep 2025 financial-services writeup — account_number parameter override returns other users' onboarding/funding state without PII but with regulatory-grade privacy violation. The pattern: any API where the account / customer identifier is in the request body or path and isn't checked against session ownership. Pays high four-figure to low five-figure on most fintech programs even without PII when state-disclosure has compliance implications (GDPR, GLBA, PCI).

SCIM / IdP / IAM endpoints. SCIM is a magnet for IDOR because the spec encourages identifier-driven update operations. Keycloak SCIM PUT body ID override (issue #46658, Feb 2026) — ScimResourceTypeResource.update() validates URL {id} exists, then calls update() with the body's id field, allowing path-vs-body mismatch attack to update any SCIM-managed resource. Hunt every SCIM /Users/{id} and /Groups/{id} PUT for path-body consistency.